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Evaluating the Success of Urban Success Stories 
Harold L. Wolman, Coit Cook Ford III and Edward Hill 
Summary. Arresting and reversing the condition of urban distress in America's cities represents 
one of the most challenging and perplexing problems confronting policy-makers. Indeed, urban 
distress in American cities has proved to be a stubborn and largely intractable phenomenon 
during the past two decades. Nevertheless, a number of cities that were experiencing distress at 
the beginning of the 1980s are now being acclaimed as 'urban success stories' or 'revitalised' 
cities. We evaluate the performance, between 1980 and 1990, of these supposedly 'revitalised' 
cities on objective indicators of the economic well-being of their residents and compare their 
performance to that other cities that were equally distressed in 1980. We conclude that with the 
exception of Atlanta, Baltimore and Boston, the purportedly 'revitalised' cities performed no 
better with respect to change in the economic well-being of their residents than did other cities 
that were equally distressed in 198~nd in many cases performed worse. 
The condition of America's distressed urban 
areas represents one of the most serious and 
vexing problems facing the nation. Urban 
economic distress has been both persistent 
and highly resistant to policy solutions (see 
Bradbury et al., 1982). Yet, in the face of 
these problems, it is widely acknowledged 
that there have been examples of urban suc-
cesses. Both popular and academic journals 
have heralded the revitalisation of cities such 
as Baltimore, Pittsburgh and, more recently, 
Cleveland.1 Such success stories have nat-
urally attracted the attention and interest of 
public officials and community leaders in 
distressed cities that are desperately seeking 
solutions to their own problems. Indeed, del-
egations from distressed cities are frequent 
visitors to these 'successful' cities, hoping to 
learn from them and to emulate their success. 
Unfortunately, these visitors-and others 
who herald these 'urban success stories'-
are frequently quite unclear about the nature 
of these successes and the benefits they pro-
duce. 
There are obviously many different ways 
of defining and measuring 'success'. Success 
may be viewed in terms of improvement in a 
variety of economic, social and physical con-
ditions such as increased business invest-
ment, physical redevelopment, reduction in 
crime and infant mortality rates, increases in 
educational achievement, etc. In this paper, 
our concern is with improvement in the econ-
omic well-being of area residents, a concern 
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widely held to be of substantial importance. 
Our objective is to determine whether cities 
that are perceived to have undergone econ-
omic revitalisation have, at the same time, 
experienced improvement in the economic 
well-being of their residents. We pursue this 
objective by comparing changes in the econ-
omic well-being of residents in cities per-
ceived to have undergone successful urban 
revitalisation to changes in the economic 
well-being of residents in cities that were 
similar to them prior to their supposed revi-
talisation. This will permit us to assess the 
extent to which 'urban success stories' are 
myth or reality, at least with respect to the 
economic well-being of their residents. 
As Ladd and Yinger (1989) observe, urban 
revitalisation can benefit cities by improving 
(1) their economic base (increasing employ-
ment and output in the city); 
(2) their fiscal condition; or 
(3) the well-being of their residents. 
Well-being is a multi-faceted construct that 
includes economic, social and psychological 
components (see Wolman and Goldsmith, 
1992, for a discussion of the concept of 
residential well-being). In this article, our 
concern is the extent to which the perceived 
'urban success stories' have actually im-
proved the economic well-being of their resi-
dents relative to that of residents of other 
cities that were similar to them, prior to 
their supposed revitalisation, in degree of 
distress. We do not address the relationship 
between perceived success and other objec-
tive success measures such as those previ-
ously discussed, although, we believe such 
relationships worthy of exploration, and in-
vite others to apply our methodology to that 
end. Instead, we are concerned with whether 
public perceptions of success are related to 
reality, at least with respect to improvements 
in the economic well-being of city residents. 
Furthermore, we take these perceptions as 
given-i.e. we are not concerned with the 
causes of these perceptions or why they 
arise, but with whether these perceptions of 
success accord with reality. Such public per-
ceptions, whatever their origins, are import-
ant, for they condition and influence the 
actions of policy-makers and community de-
cision-makers, often in quite profound ways. 
The question of whether urban revitalisa-
tion has actually benefited city residents has 
been widely discussed and debated in the 
literature (see, for example, the exchange 
between Levine (1987a, 1987b) and Berkow-
itz (1987), the various contributors in Squires 
(1989), Fainstein et al. (1986), Clavel 
(1986), Riposa and Andranovich (1988), 
Barnekov et al. (1989) and Brownhill (1990). 
However, it has not been the subject of sys-
tematic empirical research across a range of 
cities. 
In order to pursue our objective we make 
use of a form of natural experiment. First, we 
identify cities that were distressed in 1980, 
but have (purportedly) successfully revi-
talised since that time. We then compare the 
extent to which the economic well-being of 
the residents of these perceived 'successful' 
cities has improved from 1980 to 1990, with 
that of the residents of cities which were 
similarly distressed in 1980 but are not per-
ceived to have undergone successful revitali-
sation. We call the latter the perceived 
'unsuccessful cities'. Finally, we identify 
those distressed cities in 1980 that, in fact, 
experienced the greatest increase in resident 
economic well-being during the past decade. 
Methodology 
The first step was to identify the 'urban 
success stories' -that is, cities that were dis-
tressed in 1980, but are widely believed to 
have successfully revitalised over the course 
of the past decade. Rather than relying on 
impressions from the media, we decided to 
consult expert opinion in a systematic man-
ner. Specifically, we asked a set of highly 
informed observers to identify those cities 
that had been distressed in 1980, but had 
undergone successful revitalisation by the 
end of the decade. 
We began by identifying a set of cities that 
were distressed according to objective cri-
teria in 1980. The first step involved devel-
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oping an index of urban distress. There is a 
substantial literature on what constitutes ur-
ban distress. Bradbury et al. (1982) dis-
tinguish between descriptive decline, which 
they measure through changes in population 
and employment, and functional distress, 
which they measure through changes in vari-
ables such as the unemployment rate, per 
capita income, the incidence of poverty and 
the rate of violent crime. Franklin James 
(1990) develops a 'city distress index' that 
combines resident needs, as measured by city 
poverty rate, unemployment rate and per cap-
ita income growth, and population change. 
Other measures abound (see, for example, 
Nathan and Adams (1976), Cuciti (1978) and 
Fossett and Nathan (1981). For reviews of 
this literature, see James (1990) and Sternlieb 
(1980). 
Our urban distress index combines both 
descriptive and functional indicators and is 
quite similar to that of James (1990). We 
utilised five indicators: 
(1) the 1980 unemployment rate; 
(2) the 1980 poverty rate (persons); 
(3) 1980 median household income 
(4) percentage change between 1970 and 
1980 in per capita income; and 
(5) percentage change between 1970 and 
1980 in population 
A distribution of standard scores was created 
for each of the individual indicators. The 
indicators were standardised by converting 
them to n scores.2 The standardised scores 
for each city were then summed across all 
five indicators (thus weighting each of the 
indicators equally) to create a cumulative 
index of urban health (see AppendixV The 
bottom third of the cities in this distribution 
were designated as 'distressed' (n =50). 
We then solicited the opinions of a set of 
experts, sending them a survey letter that 
included the list of the 50 most distressed 
cities in 1980, and asking them to select up 
to 10 that had experienced the strongest 
'economic turnaround or urban revitalisa-
tion' by the end of the decade. The survey 
was sent to members of the editorial boards 
of the leading American academic journals 
concerned with urban affairs and economic 
development (Urban Affairs Quarterly, Jour-
nal of Urban Affairs and Economic Develop-
ment Quarterly), and to members of the 
Executive Boards of two leading economic 
development practitioner organisations, the 
American Economic Development Council 
(AEDC) and the Council on Urban Econ-
omic Development (CUED). Our response 
rate was 47.8 per cent (76 responses from 
159 sampled). 
We deemed 'successfully revitalised' 
those cities (n = 12) that were named by 20 
per cent or more of the respondents, and 
'most successfully revitalised' those cities 
(n = 6) that were named by 40 per cent or 
more of the respondents (Table 1). In order 
to ensure that the successfully revitalised 
cities did not differ from the other distressed 
cities as of 1980 (i.e. they were both part of 
the same distressed population), we com-
pared the means of the two groups of cities 
using a difference of means test, and found 
no statistically significant difference between 
them. 
Again, we emphasise that this process 
yielded only perceptions, albeit of reason-
ably informed people, and that this is what it 
was designed to do. We did not use it as a 
means of determining which cities had, in 
fact, successfully undergone urban revitalisa-
tion in objective terms, and we do not argue 
that perceptions accord with reality. We also 
do not know how these perceptions were 
formed. Our intent was to capture percep-
tions, based on what our informed respon-
dents carried around in their minds, rather 
than to capture objective reality based on 
data. 
Comparisons of the performance of the 
different groups of cities between 1980 and 
1990 were then made on a series of indica-
tors of the economic well-being of residents. 
We focus on the economic well-being of 
residents because the ultimate benefit of spa-
tial revitalisation must be measured in terms 
of whether or not people (rather than tracts of 
land) are better off, and economic benefits 
are nearly universally recognised as being of 
substantial importance. 
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Table 1. The 'successfully revitalised' cities, I980-90 
Central city State Count Response (%) 
Pittsburgh Pennsylvania 63 82.9 
Baltimore Maryland 49 64.5 
Atlanta Georgia 40 52.6 
Cleveland Ohio 37 48.7 
Cincinnati Ohio 33 43.4 
Louisville Kentucky 3I 40.8 
Miami Florida 23 30.3 
Boston Massachusetts 22 28.9 
Chicago Illinois 22 28.9 
Birmingham Alabama 18 23.7 
Buffalo New York I8 23.7 
Norfolk Virginia I6 21.1 
Total count 54 I 
Total respondents 76 
Average responses 7.I2 
Survey organizations Responses (Number) 
American Economic Development Council I3 
Council on Urban Economic Development I8 
Journal of Urban Affairs II 
Economic Development Quarterly 22 
Urban Affairs Quarterly I4 
Duplicate Membership (respondents) 2 
76 
I 59 
47.8 
Total respondents 
Total number surveyed 
Survey response rate (%) 
Note: The 'successfully revitalised' cities were selected by respondents from 
a set of 50 cities that were experiencing distress in I980 according to their 
scores on an index of urban health. (See Appendix note for a description of 
the methodology.) 
How should economic well-being be con-
ceptualised and operationalised? Conceptu-
ally, we define economic well-being of area 
residents to consist of the ability to purchase 
goods and services (income), the distribution 
of income among residents, and the ability to 
participate effectively in area labour markets 
(as a component of economic well-being it-
self, irrespective of the income such partici-
pation might produce). Since our concern is 
with change in economic well-being, opera-
tionally we seek measures of change in real 
income, in the distribution of income, and in 
the labour force status of area residents. 
Three measures of change in income and 
the distribution of income were used: (1) 
percentage change in median household in-
come and (2) percentage change in per capita 
income as measures of change in income, 
and (3) percentage point change in the rate of 
persons below the poverty line as a measure 
of distribution. We expect that 'successfully 
revitalised' cities will have experienced 
larger increases in both median household 
and per capita income and greater reductions 
in the rate of poverty than will the unrevi-
talised or 'unsuccessful' cities. 
To operationalise the labour force status of 
area residents, we used two measures that are 
common in the labour economics literature: 
the percentage point change in the unem-
ployment rate and the percentage point 
Table 2. Comparative performance of perceived `successfully revitalised' and perceived `unsuccessful'
cities, 1980-90
	
Note : The index of well-being is the product of the summation of the standard scores for changes in five
indicators of resident economic well-being between 1980 and 1990 . These include : percentage point
change in the unemployment rate, the rate of persons below the poverty line and the labour force
participation rate ; as well as percentage change in median household income and per capita income. The
percentage point changes in the unemployment rate and the rate of persons below the poverty line are
adjusted (multiplied by negative one) so that a positive sign on all indicators connotes relative improvement
in economic well-being .
change in the labour force participation rate .
Employment-the possession of a job-is
seen as, in itself, an important component of
economic well-being . Lower unemployment
rates thus imply greater economic well-being
for area residents . We expect that 'success-
fully revitalised' cities will have experienced
a greater tightening of labour markets over
the decade relative to `unsuccessful' cities
and, consequently, reductions in unemploy-
ment rates relative to these cities . This ex-
pectation is consistent with Bartik's (1991)
work on state and local economic develop-
ment policy .
Increases in labour force participation
reflect increased optimism on the part of area
residents about the prospects of gaining em-
ployment and thus, in our terms, an increase
in their economic well-being . Eberts and
Stone (1992) have conclusively shown that
local labour markets adjust to fluctuations in
the demand for labour by changing their
labour force participation rates . Thus, we
expect that if cities have truly revitalised,
then their labour force participation rates will
be higher than rates found in the unsuccess-
ful cities .
We first compared the 12 `successfully
revitalised' cities with the 38 other cities that
were distressed in 1980, but were perceived
by our panel as not having undergone suc-
cessful revitalisation over the decade . Next,
we compared the 6 `most successfully revi-
talised' cities to the 38 `unsuccessful' cities .
Findings
Did the distressed cities which were per-
ceived by our experts to have successfully
revitalised during the past decade actually
perform better than the other distressed cities
in terms of our indicators of resident econ-
omic well-being? To answer this query, we
compared the means of the supposedly 'suc-
cessfully revitalised' cities with the means of
the supposedly `unsuccessful' cities on each
of the five indicators . Since we were dealing
with two populations of cities rather than
samples (all cities in metropolitan areas of
250 000 or more that were distressed in
1980), differences found between the popula-
tions were real differences, not sampling er-
ror. Nevertheless, in order to determine
whether the observed differences were large
enough to be significant under more rigorous
statistical assumptions (i .e . if we considered
the cities as a sample of all possible dis-
tressed cities over a long period of time), we
Indicator
Successful
(N= 12)
Mean
Unsuccessful
(N = 38)
Mean
Test statistic
(critical :
- 1 .96, 1 .96)
Unemployment rate (percentage point change) 1.40 1 .27 -0.347
Poverty rate (percentage point change) 2.53 2.91 0.275
Labour force participation (percentage point change) 2.78 2.70 -0.111
Median household income (percentage change) 73.38 76.78 0.390
Per capita income (percentage change) 89.36 87.57 -0.220
Index of economic well-being (n scores) -0.038 0.012 0.043
EVALUATING THE SUCCESS OF URBAN SUCCESS STORIES
EVALUATING THE SUCCESS OF URBAN SUCCESS STORIES
Table 3. Comparative perfonnance of perceived 'most successfully revitalised' and perceived 
'unsuccessful' cities, 1980--90 
Indicator 
Unemployment rate (percentage point change) 
Poverty rate (percentage point change) 
Most 
successful 
(N=6) 
Mean 
Unsuccessful 
(N= 38) 
Mean 
Test statistic 
(critical: 
- 1.96, 1.96) 
-0.058 
-0.055 
Labour force participation (percentage point change) 
Median household income (percentage change) 
1.30 
3.03 
2.47 
69.10 
91.35 
1.27 
2.91 
2.70 
76.78 
87.57 
0.296 
0.800 
-0.350 Per capita income (percentage change) 
Index of economic well-being (n scores) -0.222 0.012 0.228 
Test criterion: p = 0.05, Z probability distribution 
applied a difference of means test. In doing 
so, we found no statistically significant dif-
ference for any of the indicators (see 
Table 2). 
Indeed, the 'successfully revitalised' cities 
were actually outperformed by the 'unsuc-
cessful' cities on some of our indicators. The 
'unsuccessful' cities did better than the 'suc-
cessful' cities in terms of the percentage 
point change in the unemployment rate-the 
rate increased in the 'successful' cities by 
1.40 percentage points, while it increased by 
1.27 percentage points in the 'unsuccessful' 
cities. The 'unsuccessful' cities also saw 
greater improvements in median income than 
did the 'successful' cities (76.8 per cent in 
nominal dollars compared to 73.4 per cent). 
The 'successfully revitalised' cities did do 
slightly better than the 'unsuccessful' cities 
with respect to percentage change in per 
capita income and percentage point change 
in the poverty rate, but these differences 
were slight and as noted, far short of statisti-
cal significance. 
We next constructed an overall 'index of 
economic well-being' as a summary measure 
of the change in resident economic well-be-
ing from 1980 to 1990. The index was con-
structed by summing the standard scores of 
the five indicators (percentage point change 
in: the unemployment rate, labour force par-
ticipation rate and the poverty rate and per-
centage change in median household income 
and in per capita income). The 'unsuccessful' 
cities actually had a slightly higher summary 
index of resident economic well-being than 
the 'successfully revitalised' cities (0.012 
compared to - 0.038), although the differ-
ences were not statistically significant. 
In order to provide a more stringent test, 
we next compared the performance of the 
six 'most successfully revitalised' cities-
those which 40 per cent or more of the 
respondents had mentioned-with that of the 
38 'unsuccessful' cities. Remarkably, the 
'unsuccessful' cities outperformed the 'most 
successfully revitalised' cities on all of the 
five indicators of resident economic well-be-
ing (except change in per capita inco~e) and 
on the summary index (0.012 compared to 
- 0.222). Again, there were no statistically 
significant differences between the two 
groups of cities, either with respect to the 
individual indicators or the summary index 
of performance (see Table 3). 
Since averages may hide important differ-
ences in individual city performance, we ex-
amined the individual means of the 6 'most 
successfully revitalised' cities on each indi-
cator of economic well-being by comparing 
them to the means of the 38 'unsuccessful' 
cities. It is clear from this analysis (see Table 
4) that two of the perceived 'most success-
fully revitalised' cities-Atlanta and Balti-
more-did perform considerably better than 
the 'unsuccessful' cities. Baltimore per-
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Table 4. Individual city changes on the indicators of resident economic well-being, 'most successfully 
revitalised' cities, 1980-90 
Percentage 
Percentage Percentage point change 
change in point change Percentage in the labour 
Percentage median in persons change in force 
point change house below the per capita participation 
City unemployment income poverty line income rate 
Pittsburgh 2.2 54.7 4.9 83.8 1.5 
Baltimore 0.1* 87.7 -1.0* 104.1 * 3.7 
Atlanta 1.5 97.2* -0.2* 133.7* 4.1* 
Cleveland 3.9 45.2 6.6 60.5 0.3 
Cincinnati -0.4* 65.7 4.6 82.5 3.2 
Louisville 0.5* 64.1 3.3 83.5 2.0 
Mean 'unsuccessful cities' 1.27 76.78 2.91 87.57 2.70 
Note: The values for each city that are half standard deviation units beyond the mean of the 'unsuccessful 
cities' (n = 38) for each indicator of resident economic well-being are marked with an asterisk. 
formed better than the 'unsuccessful' cities 
on each of the five indicators; and on three of 
these indicators (unemployment rate, poverty 
rate and per capita income), Baltimore's 
mean was at least half a standard deviation 
better than the mean of the 'unsuccessful' 
cities. Atlanta performed better than the 
'unsuccessful' cities on four of the five indi-
cators (all but change in unemployment rate); 
and for each of these four indicators, At-
lanta's mean was at least half a standard 
deviation better than the mean of the 'unsuc-
cessful' cities. However, Cleveland and Pitts-
burgh performed more poorly than the 
'unsuccessful' cities on all five of the indica-
tors (indeed, Cleveland was more than half a 
standard deviation below the mean perform-
ance of the 'unsuccessful' cities on four of 
the five indicators), while Louisville per-
formed more poorly on four of the indicators 
and Cincinnati on three. 
We also examined separately the other six 
cities comprising the set of 'successfully re-
vitalised' cities. Of the six, only Boston 
clearly outperformed the 'unsuccessful' cit-
ies, experiencing beneficial changes in the 
economic well-being of their residents as 
demonstrated by being half a standard devi-
ation or more beyond the mean of the 'un-
successful' cities on four of the five 
indicators. Norfolk also outperformed the 
'unsuccessful' cities on four of the five indi-
cators, but on only one was it more than half 
a standard deviation better than their mean. 
The other four cities perceived to be 'suc-
cessfully revitalised' (Miami, Chicago, 
Birmingham and Buffalo) all performed 
more poorly than the 'unsuccessful' cities on 
at least three of the five indicators of econ-
omic well-being (see Table 5). 
It is possible that our survey respondents 
may have been focusing on metropolitan ar-
eas rather than central cities when they listed 
urban areas that experienced 'the strongest 
economic turnaround or urban revitalisation'. 
It is also possible that the impact of urban 
revitalisation may have exerted its most sub-
stantial economic effect on the residents of 
the entire metropolitan area rather than 
specifically on the residents of central cities, 
with suburban residents benefiting most from 
the increased economic viability of the cen-
tral city. Accordingly, we repeated our analy-
sis for the metropolitan areas of the 
'successfully revitalised', 'most successfully 
revitalised', and 'unsuccessful' cities. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
gather labour force participation rate data on 
a comparable metropolitan area basis for 
both 1980 and 1990, so the metropolitan area 
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Table 5. Individual city changes on the indicators of resident economic well-being, 'next most successfully 
revitalised' cities, 1980-90 
Percentage 
Percentage Percentage point change 
change in point change Percentage in the labour 
Percentage median in persons change in force 
point change house below the per capita participation 
City unemployment income poverty line income rate 
Miami 4.1 52.8 6.7 61.1 0.0 
Boston 2.3 132.9* -1.5* 137.7* 6.4* 
Chicago 2.3 71.9 1.3 84.5 3.0 
Birmingham -1.7* 60.6 2.8 74.2 1.8 
Buffalo -0.6* 59.4 4.9 76.2 3.9 
Norfolk 2.6 88.4 -1.4* 90.5 3.4 
Mean 'unsuccessful cities' 1.27 76.78 2.91 87.57 2.70 
Note: The values for each city that are half standard deviation units beyond the mean of the 'unsuccessful 
cities' (n = 38) for each indicator of resident economic well-being are marked with an asterisk. 
index of economic well-being consisted of 
four indicators rather than five. Nevertheless, 
our findings were essentially the same as for 
the previous analysis (see Table 6). 
There were no statistically significant dif-
ferences between the performance of the 
metropolitan areas of the 'successfully revi-
talised' cities and the metropolitan areas of 
the 'unsuccessful' cities. Indeed, the 'unsuc-
cessful' metropolitan areas outperformed the 
'successfully revitalised' metropolitan areas 
on three of the four indicators, having some-
what greater percentage increases in both 
median household and per capita income and 
a greater decline in the unemployment rate 
( - 1.69 percentage points compared to 
- 1.03). The 'unsuccessful' areas also per-
formed better on the summary index of resi-
dent economic well-being. We repeated the 
analysis for the six metropolitan areas of the 
'most successfully revitalised' cities with 
much the same results (see Table 7). 
Our analysis has convincingly shown that 
the so-called urban success stories were, on 
the whole, mythical-at least so far as the 
economic condition of the residents is con-
cerned. We can now consider the question of 
which distressed cities did experience the 
best performance with respect to our sum-
mary index of resident economic well-being 
from 1980 to 1990. The n scores on the 
summary indicator for all the 50 cities are 
listed in order of performance (best to worst) 
in Table 8. The index consists of the sum-
mation of the city n scores from each of the 
five indicators (percentage point change in 
unemployment rate, poverty rate and labour 
force participation rate; and percentage 
change in median household and per capita 
income). By these criteria, the six best-per-
forming cities over the period are, in order, 
Wilmington, Paterson, Atlantic City, Jersey 
City, Boston and New York. Clearly there is 
a regional factor at work-for cities and their 
metropolitan areas are likely to perform in 
much the same manner as the region of 
which they are a part, and the Mid-Atlantic 
and New England regions performed very 
well during the 1980s. Of the perceived 
'most successfully revitalised' cities, Atlanta 
ranks 12th, Baltimore 14th, Cincinnati 21st, 
Louisville 30th, Pittsburgh 38th and Cleve-
land 44th. 
Discussion 
We have examined the cities that are per-
ceived to be 'urban success stories' and 
found that, taken as a group, they performed 
no better with respect to change in the econ-
omic well-being of their residents-and in 
many cases performed worse-than did other 
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Table 6. Comparative performance of the metropolitan areas of perceived 'successfully revitalised' cities 
to the metropolitan areas of perceived 'unsuccessful' cities, 1980-90 
Indicator 
Unemployment rate (percentage point change) 
Poverty rate (percentage point change) 
Median house income (percentage change) 
Per capita income (percentage change) 
Index of economic well-being (n scores) 
cities that were equally distressed in 1980. 
We did find that three of the cities reputed 
to be successful-Atlanta, Baltimore and 
Boston-performed considerably better than 
the other distressed cities; they could 
justifiably be termed 'urban success stories', 
although, with the possible exception of 
Boston, they were by no means the best 
performers of the distressed cities. 
How can we account for these findings, 
and how do we interpret them? First, we 
must state the obvious: we purposefully did 
not define the terms 'economic turnaround' 
or 'urban revitalisation' for our respondents, 
and it is uncertain what criteria they were 
using when they identified those cities that 
had experienced the 'strongest economic 
turnaround or urban revitalisation'. It is 
clear, however, that improvement in the 
economic well-being of the residents was not 
the criterion by which urban revitalisation 
was being measured, or, if it was, it was 
badly misperceived. 
If we were to define urban revitalisation in 
objective terms (e.g. an increase in residen-
tial, commercial and industrial investment in 
the city), it may be that some or all of these 
cities did not undergo urban revitalisation at 
all. Or, perhaps, these cities did experience 
such revitalisation, but it did not produce an 
improvement in the relative economic well-
being of their residents. Instead, 'urban revi-
talisation' might have been manifested in 
improvements in the city's economic base 
(e.g. an increase in the number of jobs lo-
cated in the city) or fiscal condition. Indeed, 
Most Successful Unsuccessful Test statistic 
(N= 12) (N= 38) (critical: 
Mean Mean - 1.96, 1.96) 
-1.03 -1.69 -1.36 
0.37 0.51 0.21 
76.93 81.81 0.73 
98.84 104.21 0.87 
-0.54 0.17 0.72 
it is possible that one or both of these condi-
tions may have served as implicit criteria by 
which our respondents identified cities which 
had undergone economic turnaround or ur-
ban revitalisation. 
In the end, of course, we do not know 
what was in the minds of our respondents or 
why they responded as they did. This is an 
interesting subject, and one worthy of further 
research. An initial hypothesis is that percep-
tion of downtown redevelopment efforts 
greatly influences perception of urban suc-
cess. (Physical development is frequently 
viewed by planners and development profes-
sionals as the leading indicator, if not the 
culmination, of revitalisation. See Frieden 
and Sagalyn, 1989). If this hypothesis is 
valid, then the cities that are perceived as 
most revitalised will be those that experi-
enced the most substantial improvement in 
their central business districts, the most vis-
ible part of an area's image. Redevelopment 
of the central business district in terms of 
both new office buildings and the presence of 
retail stores and boutiques, recreational op-
portunities and tourist attractions may drive 
public perceptions of the well-being of the 
entire urban area. However, if this hypothesis 
is true, then it must be said that improved 
downtown image did not translate, at least 
immediately, into improvements in the econ-
omic well-being of residents, either in the 
city or in the metropolitan area as a whole.4 
An interesting, though highly speculative 
explanation, can also be constructed from the 
data we have presented on the performance 
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Table 7. Comparative performance of the metropolitan areas of perceived 'most successfully revitalised' 
cities to the metropolitan areas of perceived 'unsuccessful' cities, 1980-90 
Indicator 
Unemployment rate (percentage point change) 
Poverty rate (percentage point change) 
Median house income (percentage change) 
Per capita income (percentage change) 
Index of economic well-being (n scores) 
Most Successful Unsuccessful 
(N= 12) (N= 38) 
Mean Mean 
-1.28 
0.48 
73.00 
99.13 
-0.63 
-1.69 
0.51 
81.81 
104.21 
0.17 
Test statistic 
(critical: 
- 1.96, 1.96) 
-0.83 
O.D3 
1.02 
0.71 
0.70 
Test criterion: p = 0.05, Z probability distribution 
of the 'most successfully revitalised' cttJ.es 
relative to the 'unsuccessful' ones. First of 
all, per capita income increased more in the 
six 'most successfully revitalised' cities than 
in the unsuccessful ones, but median house-
hold income increased more in the 38 
'unsuccessful cities'. The only possible ex-
planation for this is that household size de-
clined more rapidly in the most successful 
cities, which would be consistent with a rela-
tively greater increase in young single indi-
viduals and childless couples (yuppies) 
frequently associated with revitalisation of 
downtown areas and gentrification. The 
small, but greater increase, in the unemploy-
ment rate and poverty rate in the 'most suc-
cessfully revitalised' cttJ.es would be 
consistent with a worsening of the income 
distribution and growing disparities between 
the wealthy and the poor. 
Summary and Conclusion 
We begin by emphasising what we did find 
and what we did not. Cities that have been 
perceived as 'urban success stories' have not, 
in fact, been successful, at least in so far as 
improving the economic well-being of their 
residents. The change in the economic well-
being of residents of cities that are typified as 
'urban success stories' between 1980 and 
1990 did not differ from-and in some cases 
was inferior to--change in the economic 
well-being of residents of other cities that 
were (like the 'urban success stories') dis-
tressed in 1980. 
Our findings do not suggest that actual (as 
opposed to perceived) urban revitalisation 
might not lead to improvements in the econ-
omic well-being of residents, unless one 
assumes (and we do not) that the correspon-
dence between perceived and actual urban 
revitalisation is exact. Our findings relate to 
the common perceptions which drive policy-
makers (and urban experts as well) to evalu-
ate city performance and learn from 
'successes'. We argue that efforts to copy the 
policies and development activities of these 
'success stories' may well be misplaced, at 
least if improving the economic well-being 
of area residents is the goal that is being 
pursued. 
We have no data that relate to actual urban 
revitalisation. It would indeed be useful to 
identify which cities have actually achieved 
urban revitalisation and to examine the effect 
of revitalisation on economic well-being. 
Such an effort would require a careful con-
ceptual definition of urban revitalisation and 
selection of a corresponding operational vari-
able for which data could be collected. 
Our work also raises interesting questions 
about what urban experts, policy-makers and 
others mean when they make use of the term 
'urban revitalisation'. We view this as an 
important question, since we believe that 
mental constructs about the nature of a 
phenomenon are important determinants of 
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Table 8. Central city economic perfonnance on the index 
of economic well-being, 1980-90 (emboldened cities are 
those selected as 'successfully revitalised'.) 
Central city 
Wilmington 
Paterson 
Atlantic City 
Jersey City 
Boston 
New York 
New Haven 
Newark 
New Brunswick 
Trenton 
Bridgeport 
Atlanta 
Albany 
Baltimore 
Philadelphia 
Reading 
Scranton 
Providence 
Norfolk 
York 
Cincinnati 
Utica 
Birmingham 
Springfield 
Chicago 
Syracuse 
Buffalo 
Binghamton 
New Bedford 
Louisville 
Augusta 
Macon 
St. Louis 
Hartford 
Akron 
Harrisburg 
Rochester 
Pittsburgh 
Dayton 
Huntington 
Canton 
New Orleans 
Saginaw 
Cleveland 
Miami 
Flint 
Detroit 
Johnstown 
Gary 
Youngstown 
State 
Delaware 
New Jersey 
New Jersey 
New Jersey 
Massachusetts 
New York 
Connecticut 
New Jersey 
New Jersey 
New Jersey 
Connecticut 
Georgia 
New York 
Maryland 
Pennsylvania 
Pennsy 1 vania 
Pennsy 1 vania 
Rhode Island 
Virginia 
Pennsylvania 
Ohio 
New York 
Alabama 
Massachusetts 
Illinois 
New York 
New York 
New York 
Massachusetts 
Kentucky 
Georgia 
Georgia 
Missouri 
Massachusetts 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Ohio 
West Virginia 
Ohio 
Louisiana 
Michigan 
Ohio 
Florida 
Michigan 
Michigan 
Pennsylvania 
Indiana 
Ohio 
Index score 
9.388 
7.374 
6.120 
5.960 
5.943 
4.487 
4.422 
4.027 
3.767 
3.650 
3.515 
3.482 
3.470 
2.835 
1.632 
1.516 
1.090 
0.774 
0.703 
0.552 
0.007 
-0.064 
-0.069 
-0.140 
-0.142 
-0.166 
-0.228 
-0.297 
-0.316 
-0.334 
-0.497 
-0.661 
-0.919 
-0.936 
- 1.194 
- 1.250 
- 1.335 
-2.066 
-2.184 
-3.863 
-4.236 
-4.597 
-5.253 
-5.334 
-5.758 
-5.967 
-5.967 
-6.886 
-7.001 
-8.080 
Note: See text for an explanation of the creation and 
composition of this index. 
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how policy-makers frame both problems and 
solutions. 'Urban revitalisation', whatever it 
is, has a highly positive valence; it is seen to 
be a good thing, worthy of pursuit and emu-
lation. But of what does this good thing 
consist? Clearer understanding of what peo-
ple mean by 'urban revitalisation' might also 
lead to more critical thinking about which 
aspects of it are indeed 'good' and which are 
more problematic. This, too, is worthy of 
additional research. 
In future work, we intend to examine what 
factors account for the performance of those 
distressed cities that actually improved the 
economic well-being of their residents. Two 
important questions that arise are what fac-
tors accounted for their superior performance 
and to what extent can that performance be 
attributed to policy choices made by these 
cities, rather than to regional and national 
economic factors? Using the same data set 
we also intend to examine the relative per-
formance of central cities and their metro-
politan areas and address the extent to which 
central city economic performance affects 
the performance of the city's suburbs and the 
metropolitan area as a whole. 
Notes 
1. The popular press has written extensively on 
the subject of 'comeback cities' or 'urban 
success stories', focusing largely on the 
physical revitalisation of the downtown 
cores. See, for example, "Spiffing up the 
Urban Heritage" Time, 23 November 1987; 
"When Cities Smile Again" The Economist, 
16 January 1988; "The Rest of the Major 
Cities" Fortune, 23 October 1989 and "You 
Wanna Meet Here", Sales and Marketing 
Management, November 1990. 
2. N scores are conceptually equivalent to z 
scores, but are distributed in standard devi-
ation units from the median rather that the 
mean. Thus, n scores have the advantage of 
being less influenced by sample outliers in 
the creation of a distribution of scores. 
3. The signs on the standard scores of the un-
employment rate and poverty rate were re-
versed (multiplied by negative one) in the 
index, so that a positive score constituted an 
improvement in economic condition. 
4. Indeed, it would suggest that the downtown 
development and increased activity, if it oc-
curred, involved redistribution of economic 
activity from other parts of the metropolitan 
area to downtown rather than an increase in 
overall economic activity. However, even if 
this hypothesis is true, we hasten to add that 
we are not arguing that downtown develop-
ment and enhancement of a city's image may 
not have some beneficial effects in terms of 
the residents' own image of their city and 
consequent psychological improvements in 
their quality of life, or indeed, in terms of 
economic development and economic well-
being. It may be true (it may not as well) that 
any positive economic development gains 
derived from a city's image enhancement 
require a substantial lead time before in-
vestors of mobile capital respond. Baltimore, 
Boston and Atlanta have, it is true, been 
recognised as 'urban success stories' longer 
that have Pittsburgh and Cleveland. 
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Appendix. Central City Performance on the Index of Urban Health, 1980 
Central city State Index score 
Lexington-Fayette Kentucky 8.236 
San Jose California 7.948 
Anaheim California 7.191 
Houston Texas 6.678 
Bakersfield California 6.326 
Appleton Wisconsin 6.299 
Tulsa Oklahoma 5.894 
Wichita Kansas 5.719 
Honolulu Hawaii 5.713 
Raleigh North Carolina 5.705 
Santa Rosa California 5.664 
Davenport Iowa 5.525 
Aurora Illinois 4.893 
Austin Texas 4.890 
Colorado Springs Colorado 4.877 
Oklahoma City Oklahoma 4.676 
Phoenix Arizona 4.675 
Portsmouth New Hampshire 4.625 
Charlotte North Carolina 4.622 
Santa Barbara California 4.078 
Nashville-Davidson Tennessee 3.957 
Modesto California 3.890 
Waukegan Illinois 3.822 
Little Rock Arkansas 3.717 
Corpus-Christi Texas 3.610 
Dallas Texas 3.483 
Albuquerque New Mexico 3.416 
Las Vegas Nevada 3.281 
Oxnard California 3.226 
Madison Wisconsin 3.198 
Evansville Indiana 3.140 
Charleston West Virginia 2.966 
Riverside California 2.946 
Des Moines Iowa 2.832 
Omaha Nebraska 2.824 
Manchester New Hampshire 2.815 
Baton Rouge Louisiana 2.804 
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Appendix.-Continued. 
Central city State Index score 
Vallejo California 2.741 
San Diego California 2.658 
Shreveport Louisiana 2.639 
Ann Arbor Michigan 2.545 
Chattanooga Tennessee 2.529 
Beaumont Texas 2.459 
Greensboro North Carolina 2.340 
Jacksonville Florida 2.306 
Denver Colorado 2.219 
Fort Lauderdale Florida 2.217 
Joliet Illinois 2.019 
Peoria Illinois 1.995 
Fort Worth Texas 1.926 
Orlando Florida 1.928 
Melbourne Florida 1.901 
Tucson Arizona 1.824 
West Palm Beach Florida 1.698 
Eugene Oregon 1.576 
Duluth Minnesota 1.460 
Johnson City Tennessee 1.455 
Montgomery Alabama 1.399 
Pensacola Florida 1.301 
Salinas California 1.281 
Indianapolis Indiana 1.171 
Charleston South Carolina 1.125 
Mobile Alabama 1.069 
McAllen Texas 1.005 
Portland Oregon 0.928 
Fresno California 0.908 
Lakeland Florida 0.899 
Rockford Illinois 0.862 
Columbus Ohio 0.847 
Minneapolis Minnesota 0.753 
San Francisco California 0.602 
Fort Wayne Indiana 0.428 
Allentown Pennsylvania 0.418 
San Antonio Texas 0.306. 
Greenville South Carolina 0.255 
Kansas City Missouri 0.238 
Lorain Ohio 0.216 
Milwaukee Wisconsin 0.196 
Seattle Washington 0.187 
Jackson Mississippi 0.161 
Spokane Washington 0.155 
Tampa Florida 0.147 
Sacramento California 0.066 
Los Angeles California 0.049 
Memphis Tennessee 0.032 
Lansing Michigan -0.019 
Tacoma Washington 
-0.139 
Salt Lake City Utah -0.212 
Knoxville Tennessee -0.332 
Hamilton Ohio 
-0.360 
Stockton California 
-0.372 
Washington District of Columbia -0.537 
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Appendix.-Continued. 
Central city State Index score 
El Paso Texas -0.596 
Worchester Massachusetts -0.660 
Erie Pennsylvania -0.680 
Toledo Ohio -1.005 
Columbia South Carolina - 1.214 
Grand Rapids Michigan - 1.338 
Oakland California -1.606 
Lancaster Pennsylvania - 1.705 
Richmond Virginia - 1.739 
Daytona Beach Florida - 1.746 
Huntington West Virginia -1.884 
Macon Georgia - 1.947 
Springfield Massachusetts -2.130 
New Orleans Louisiana -2.189 
Pittsburgh Pennsylvania -2.259 
Norfolk Virginia -2.335 
Boston Massachusetts -2.399 
Scranton Pennsylvania -2.577 
Akron Ohio -2.705 
Chicago Illinois -2.746 
Albany New York -2.840 
Canton Ohio -2.847 
Gary Indiana -2.862 
York Pennsy 1 vania -3.013 
Binghamton New York -3.148 
New Bedford Massachusetts -3.282 
Cincinnati Ohio -3.346 
Miami Florida -3.492 
Rochester New York -3.508 
Flint Michigan - 3.510 
Philadelphia Pennsylvania -3.560 
Bridgeport Connecticut -3.645 
Reading Pennsylvania -3.679 
Syracuse New York -3.682 
Birmingham Alabama -3.762 
New Brunswick New Jersey -3.770 
Johnstown Pennsylvania -3.848 
Louisville Kentucky -3.986 
New York New York -4.295 
Harrisburg Pennsylvania -4.485 
Baltimore Maryland -4.558 
Trenton New Jersey -4.701 
Utica New York -4.710 
Providence Rhode Island -4.731 
Youngstown Ohio -4.798 
Jersey City New Jersey -5.226 
Wilmington Delaware -5.446 
New Haven Connecticut -5.453 
Saginaw Michigan -5.552 
Dayton Ohio -6.025 
Atlanta Georgia -6.057 
St. Louis Missouri -6.405 
Cleveland Ohio -6.517 
Hartford Connecticut -6.727 
Buffalo New York -6.809 
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Appendix.-Continued. 
Central city 
Atlantic City 
Paterson 
Detroit 
Augusta 
Newark 
State 
New Jersey 
New Jersey 
Michigan 
Georgia 
New Jersey 
Index score 
-6.827 
-7.058 
-7.085 
-7.841 
-9.154 
Notes: The index of urban health is the product of the summation of standard-
scores for a population of central cities (n = 152) on five indicators of economic 
well-being: percentage change in population 1970-80; percentage unemployed 
1980; median household income 1980; percentage of persons below the poverty 
line 1980; and percentage change in per capita income 1970-80. The scores for 
percentage unemployed and percentage of persons below the poverty line are 
adjusted (multiplied by negative one) so that a positive score on all indicators 
connotes relative economic health. 
The emboldened entry constitutes the breaking point between the bottom third 
of the cities and the remainder of the them. All cities that are at, or lie below, 
the breaking point were designated as 'distressed' and included in the survey 
mailing. 
